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Ministerio de Economía,
Fomento y Turismo

POLICY PAPER

Redesigning the Mortgage Statement and its Impact on Consumers Mortgage Purchase Decisions: Experimental Evidence

National Consumer Protection Service (SERNAC)

Financial Consumption Sub-directorate

Behavioural Economics Unit

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SERNAC Financial Consumption Sub-Directorate Team: Andrés Pavón[1]; Miguel Pavéz[2]; and Paula Reveco[3]

Consultant Team: Denise Laroze[4]**;** Raymond Duch[5]; and Mauricio López[6]

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[1] Deputy Director of Financial Consumption; MSc in Regulation, LSE; MSc in Public Policy, UCL, apavon@sernac.cl

[2] Head of the Financial Consumption Protection Department, Master in Financial Economy, USACH

[3] Behavioural Economics Analyst, Psychologist

[4] Sub-Director of Centre for Experimental Social Science CESS (Universidad de Santiago de Chile); PhD in Government, University of Essex.

[5] Director of Centre for Experimental Social Science CESS (Nuffield College, Oxford); PhD, University of Rochester.

[6] Lab Manager, Centre for Experimental Social Science CESS (Universidad de Santiago de Chile); PhD (c) in Management Sciences, USACH

Abstract

Chilean mortgage loan market is characterized by debtors' limited understanding of financial information an low level of loans' renegotiation. As a result, there is a high risk that consumers are missing benefits from economic opportunities. That's why Chilean financial institutions must, by law, send to their customers every three months, a *Mortgage Statement* designed by the regulator.

This policy paper is an executive summary of a study that shows qualitative and quantitative evidence about the impact of Mortgage Statements on consumers' refinancing decisions. This research also delivers an option for its redesign, based on an exhaustive review of literature on financial consumer decisions, best international practices about the design of financial information booklets and, a qualitative evaluation of the current mortgage statement.

Through a random experiment, the investigation tested the impact of the prototype and the current mortgage statement on consumers' decisions to scan loan alternatives in the Chilean mortgage market. The results suggested an increase of 23.3% (between 18.3-28.4% considering the marginal error) in the probability of quoting new loan offers in comparison to those exposed to the current statement.

Considering the amount mortgage market in Chile, the redesigned mortgage statement may increase the likelihood of quoting loans for approximately 200,000-300,000 people every three months –assuming the external validity of the experiment-. Based on these findings, the study proposes a regulatory reform to redesign the mortgage statement in force.

This policy paper summarises the main findings of a more extended Report. The report is only available in Spanish, and it can be requested to the Behavioural Economics Unit of SERNAC.

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1. Introduction

Choosing a mortgage is probably the most important financial decision that consumers will make in their lives. In theory, this should motivate consumers to search, compare, and sign the best mortgage offer considering the best conditions. However, through the entire term of the loan, there might appear favorable refinancing opportunities that a consumer is unaware of or fails to understand. Indeed, national and comparative evidence indicates that most consumers keep missing profitable financial opportunities in the mortgage market, especially among low and middle-income consumers with lower levels of education (Andersen et al. 2020, Devine et al. 2015, Alexandrov & Koulayev 2018; Montoya, Noton & Solis, 2017; Johnson et al., 2016).

In Chile, in the past ten years, the average mortgage placement rate has decreased consistently, from 5.92% in January 2009 to 1.99% in November 2019. Moreover, the average interest rate fell from 3.28% to 1.99% between December 2018 and November 2019. Nevertheless, on average, the refinancing flow represented only 6% of the mortgage's operations between September 2013 and September 2019 (Banco Central, 2019).

Microeconomics theory considers that consumers will not be willing to refinance or switch their loans if the associated costs of the operation outweigh the benefits of the new offer (Agarwal, Driscoll & Laibson, 2013; Klemperer, 1995). However, the literature indicates that low levels of financial education and consumers' cognitive biases make it difficult for people to assess the benefits and costs of refinancing - keeping them in a suboptimal credit position (Lunn et al., 2018). The traditional approach to financial consumer protection has usually focused on reducing information asymmetries without giving particular importance to the context in which consumers make their decisions and process the information. For this reason, recent studies conducted by the OECD and the World Bank suggest that countries should apply the inputs of psychology and behavioral economics when designing informative booklets for the financial consumer and collect experimental evidence of the impact on consumers' behavior (OECD, 2017, World Bank, 2017).

1.1 The Chilean mortgage statement and its regulatory status

To reduce information asymmetries in the financial field, in 2011, Law No. 20,555 and its regulations establish that financial providers must periodically deliver financial statements to customers on the most relevant elements of their products and services. These obligations apply at the pre-contractual and contractual stage, as during the execution of a financial product contract. More specifically, the Regulation mandates the template and content of the "Communication of the Status of the Mortgage Loan" (from now on, the Mortgage Statement), which must be sent, at least, quarterly, to financial consumers (Supreme Decree No. 42, 2012, of the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism).

The Mortgage Statement contains standard indicators created to reflect and compare the cost of a loan, such as the CAEV –similar to the annual percentage rate. CAEV is defined by Regulation as an indicator (expressed as a percentage) and allows consumers to compare, determine and verify the suitability of signing a new mortgage loan, to pay in advance the old one or to prepay the current loan. Figure 1 shows the template and content of the existing Mortgage Statement.

1.2 Behavioral Issues and Regulatory Policy

The information included in the Mortgage Statement expect to assist consumers in the comparison of different mortgage offers, encouraging them, to quote and carry their loans to financial institutions with better conditions, when there were significant reductions in the interest rate –as it happened in Chile lately. Nonetheless, the impact of the Mortgage Statement on consumers' financial decisions has not been measured yet.

As mentioned above, international organizations encourage countries to apply the inputs of behavioral economics when designing financial consumer information products (OECD, 2017, 2019, World Bank, 2017). In fact, studies reveal the success of public policies that modify the context in which consumers make decisions and give people a stimulus –or nudge– to avoid suboptimal decisions (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009); or enhance consumers' capabilities to make a financial decision. The effectiveness of these public policies lies in the fact that many studies have shown that financial decisions are systematically influenced by errors, simplifications, biases, and heuristics that can lead to a sub-optimal decision (Thaler, 2015). In that sense, it has been estimated that over 50% of U.S mortgage-holders refinance in suboptimal terms (Agarwal et al., 2016) and only half of the consumers quote with more than one financial provider when contracting their mortgage (Hogarth & Merry, 2011; Alexandrov & Koulayev, 2018). In addition, comparative research indicates that consumers have a low level of understanding of mandatory mortgage information booklets (Lacko & Pappalardo, 2010; Bucks & Pence, 2008) and have little knowledge about the benefits of refinancing (Keys et al., 2016). Likewise, studies on mortgage switching show that there are substantial obstacles to refinancing and listing different offers because consumers lack the attention of the benefits and costs of switching due to inertia (Andersen et al, 2015; Devine et al., 2015; Campbell, 2006; Miles, 2004).

Considering these issues, it is expected that public policies that reflect how consumers make day-to-day decisions will be more effective (OECD, 2017, 2019). In this sense, a review of the best comparative practices and studies in financial decision-making suggested that the current design of the Mortgage Statement can be improved to help consumers.

1.3 Goals of the Study

The study seeks to redesign and formulate a new versión of the current Mortgage Statement in Chile. It also aims to motivate consumers on quoting, switching options and facilitates the understanding of the information provided in the financial market. To achieve these goals, this research considers:

i) Qualitative evidence collected to evaluate the current mortgage statement, as well as several prototypes, incorporating nudges methodology.

ii) An experiment designed and run to measure the impact of the current and redesigned mortgage statement on consumers' mortgage purchase choices. decisions.

Figure 1. Current mortgage statement

Comunicación Trimestral Crédito Hipotecario	
	SELLO SERNAC (si aplica)
	CAEV: XX%
Nombre Titular	-
Fecha	-
I. Producto principal	
Plazo del Crédito Pendiente (meses)	-
Número de Cuota	30/240
Saldo del Crédito	-
Valor de Dividendo	-
Fecha del Próximo Pago	-
Costo Total del Prepago	**-**
Carga Anual Equivalente Vigente (CAEV)	**-**
Garantías Vigentes	Si/No - ¿Tipo de garantía?
II. Historial	
Número de Dividendos Pagados	-
Número de Dividendos Vencidos no Pagados	-
Monto Vencido no Pagado	-
Detalle:	xxx/Cuota 1 / fecha xxx/Cuota 5 / fecha
Monto Cargado por Atrasos	
Cuota 1	-
Cuota 5	-
Monto Total Atrasado	**-**
III. Seguros Asociados al Crédito Hipotecario y Gastos o Cargos por Productos o Servicios Voluntariamente Contratados	
Seguro xxx	
Costo mensual (pesos)	-
Costo total	-
Cobertura	-
Nombre proveedor del servicio asociado	
Seguro yyy	
Costo mensual (pesos)	-
Costo total (pesos)	-
Cobertura	
Nombre proveedor del servicio asociado	-
Tasa de interés aplicada	fija/variable
Fecha en que corresponde un cambio de tasa (si aplica)	
IV. Condiciones de Prepago	
Cargo Prepago	-
Plazo de Aviso Prepago	-
V. Costos por Atraso	
Interés Moratorio (%)	-
Gastos de Cobranza (%)	-

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 evaluates the current mortgage statement considering the best-compared practices in the design of financial statements, as well as qualitative evidence. It also shows a new prototype based on the findings achieved after three focus groups, 37 interviews to mortgage-holders, and several interviews with experts conducted to assess redesign options. The results of a random experiment on the impact of the Mortgage Statement prototype on financial consumers' refinancing decisions are shown in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results of the investigation and its implications.

The final section delivers the main conclusions and formulates a proposal for regulatory improvement to the current Regulation on Information for Mortgage Loans Consumers.

2. Assessing the current mortgage statement and redesign options

According to studies in psychology, behavioural economics, international organizations recommendations to governments and regulatory agencies experiences it is highly valuable to: (i) reconsider the design of the statements that financial consumers receive, and (ii) raise experimental evidence on its impact (OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2017; Timmons et al., 2020; Johnson & Leary 2017). In particular, the World Bank (2017) emphasizes the relevance in designing financial statements that contextualize information through simple charts that allow comparing the conditions of a loan offer, to enhance personal decision-making (Chien, 2018).

in fact, graphic organizers allow consumers to have a benchmark, which is especially relevant when consumers make decisions considering few offers. In that sense, in 2009 a study conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve proposed a redesign of the information booklet to mortgage-holders in which it includes a graph showing the annual percentage rate (APR) offered in comparison with the average APRs of similar loan offers -as shown in Figure 2 (Hogarth & Merry, 2011).

Figure 2. Federal Reserve recommendation to contextualize the annual percentage rate (APR) of a loan in relation to the APRs of similar loans



Source: Hogarth & Merry, 2011; and Chien, 2018, p. 13.

Highlighting indicators of the effective cost of the loan to inform consumers, particularly those most vulnerable, has also been recommended. For instance, enhancing the understanding and transparency of the costs of financial products by incorporating informative figures such as direct and straightforward mathematical operations to express the total cost of the loan and its components. Moreover, considering the level of financial educations of the average consumer, being concise, using clear language, and understandable terms has also suggested. In other words, financial statements must be designed using a language that an average financial consumer –with an average level of reading and writing skills and minimal financial experience– will be easily able to understand the content and relevance of the statement (Chien, 2018).

Contrary to these recommendations, the current Chilean mortgage statement is shown to consumers in an unfriendly template that uses excessive technical language without comparative information and frames of reference.

Indeed, the current format and content of the Mortgage Statement were assessed through interviews and focus groups with financial consumers and experts. The main results show that the Mortgage Statement has limited utility for mortgage-holders, as it is not perceived as a useful tool to quote new loan offers. It contains multiple financial expressions challenging to understand for consumers. For example, essential concepts to make a refinancing decision – such as the CAEV (or APR)– are hard to process, and consumers commit mistakes trying to differentiate between them.

Besides, significant difficulties are reported in projecting the financial consequences of late payment. Likewise, information on complementary elements of the loan –such as guarantees and insurances– does not allow the consumer to evaluate its characteristics and consequences. Moreover, the format and organization of the information are unfriendly.

2.1 The Redesign Proposal

Based on the literature on financial consumers' decision-making and behavioral economics, SERNAC designed a series of prototypes of the mortgage statement to be tested through 3 focus groups and 37 interviews with financial consumers. Afterwards, a redesign proposal of the Mortgage Statement was designed for its subsequent study at the experimental level.

The final prototype is a two-sided sheet (Figure 3). Its obverse side is divided into the following five sections:

i) **Introduction:** it specifies the usefulness of the booklet to report the status of the loan, as well as to quote offers in the market. To strengthen confidence in the message, it disclaims that the information is forwarded by the financial institution in compliance with legal obligations, and that it was designed by SERNAC and the Ministry of Economy.

ii) **Summary of the current debt:** This section contains necessary information on the status of the mortgage loan. It modifies current financial terms such as "credit balance" for plain language easier to understand. Values are expressed in Chilean pesos, as well as U.F. (the Chilean currency unit indexed according to inflation). It also reports the number of outstanding dividends (e.g., 44/300), as well as the time remaining to pay the loan (e.g., 21 years and 4 months), since this last unit of measurement is considered the most relevant by consumers.

iii) **Status of the loan compared to other consumers in the country**. The second section incorporated two nudges to incentivize quoting mortgage rates. The first one is a thermometer that indicates the distance between the average market interest rate -reported by the Central Bank in the month before the Communication's issue date- and the interest rate applied to the debtor (for this purpose, only loans with a fixed rate were considered). This nudge considers the relevance of reference points or anchoring to stimulate decision-making.

   The second stimulus is the amount in pesos that the person could save if s/he renegotiate their mortgage and manage to reduce their current interest rate by one percentage point, keeping all other loan conditions constant. This incentive considers the power of loss aversion as an explanation for decisions.

iv) **Information to compare the conditions of the mortgage.** Using a diagram that replicates a simple arithmetic operation, this section highlights (i) the total cost of a mortgage, and (ii) the usefulness of some indicators –such as the CAEV– to compare different loan offers.

v) **Step by step guide to compare and search for better mortgage offers.** Its objective is to facilitate the use of the statement during the mortgage quoting process, allowing consumers to consider the next steps and encourage them to follow them.

On the other hand, the reverse side is divided into the following three sections:

i) **Collections due to delay.** The first section expresses the maximum amount consumers can be charged (in pesos) in the event of a one-month delay. For them the applied late payment interest is added; the maximum collection limit for extrajudicial collection expenses that a creditor can transfer to a debtor; and the values of the past due to payment and the amount corresponding to the next disbursement. This information seeks to warn about the potential effects of late payments.

ii) **Information about the guarantee of the mortgage.** This section indicates and defines the type of guarantees consumers obtain with thecredit and a brief explanation of its meaning.

iii) **Associated insurances with the mortgage**. It maintains most of the current format for reporting on loan-associated insurances but adds: (i) the insurance renewal date; (ii) the number of the insurance policy - to allow consultation on the website of the Chilean Financial Market Commission; and (iii) a warning message about the alternative of searching new insurance offers.

Figure 3. Quarterly Communication of the Statement of the Mortgage Credit' Prototype

Informativo Trimestral del Crédito Hipotecario

SELLO SERNAC (si aplica)

Descubra aquí si puede mejorar su crédito hipotecario

Estimado(a) Sr(a).

Fecha de emisión: XX-XX-XXXX

Esta comunicación contiene información actualizada sobre su crédito hipotecario. Ella ha sido diseñada por el Ministerio de Economía y SERNAC, y es enviada a Ud. en cumplimiento de la Ley N° 19.496.

Con ella Ud. podrá comparar las condiciones de su crédito y buscar mejores ofertas.

RESUMEN DE SU DEUDA VIGENTE

Valor próximo dividendo	$153.702	(5,5 UF)
Fecha pago próximo dividendo		31-12-2019
Monto adeudado	$23.784.810	(852,7 UF)
Dividendos pagados a la fecha		43/300
Dividendos pendientes y plazo	257	(21 años y 4 meses)
Fecha de inicio del crédito:		01-11-2015
Tipo de tasa de interés		Fija

ESTADO DE SU CRÉDITO EN COMPARACIÓN A OTROS CONSUMIDORES DEL PAÍS



Si Ud. reduce su tasa de interés actual de 4,7% a 3,7%, el ahorro final en su crédito actual será:

Ahorro: $2.830.747

INFORMACIÓN PARA COMPARAR LAS CONDICIONES DE SU CRÉDITO

Monto adeudado		Costo del crédito		CTC (Costo Total del Crédito por pagar)
$23.784.810	+	$15.716.778	=	$39.501.588
Es el monto prestado pendiente por pagar.		Es la suma de: Intereses: $13.742.997 Seguro: $1.973.781 Comisiones: $0		Será el monto pagado al termino de su crédito.
		La CAE vigente es un indicador que refleja el costo del crédito y le sirve para comparar con otras alternativas.	=	CAE vigente (Carga Anual Equivalente vigente) 5,04%

⚠

Un **CTC** y/o **CAE** más bajo es un ahorro para Ud., considerando igual monto, plazo y características del crédito.

* Los valores son referenciales a la fecha de la emisión. Valor U.F. = $27.892,17

PASO A PASO PARA COMPARAR Y BUSCAR MEJORES OFERTAS DE CRÉDITO

Paso 1 ☑ **Lea** atentamente esta cartilla.

Paso 2 ☐ **Simule** una oferta crediticia por un préstamo de **$24.156.397*** en servicios.cmfchile.cl/simuladorhipotecario

Paso 3 ☐ **Busque** la mejor oferta con menor CTC (Costo Total del Crédito) o menor CAE (Carga Anual Equivalente), considerando un crédito con igual plazo.

Paso 4 ☐ **Solicite** una "oferta de portabilidad financiera" en, a lo menos, las 3 instituciones financieras con las condiciones más convenientes.

Paso 5 ☐ **Escoja** el crédito hipotecario con las mejores condiciones.

*Este monto es la suma del "Monto Adeudado" y el cobro o "cargo por prepago" del crédito que su institución financiera puede cobrar conforme a la Ley N° 18.010.

Cargo por Prepago: $371.587

¿QUÉ OCURRIRÍA SI UD. SE ATRASA EN EL PAGO DE SU DIVIDENDO?

RECUERDE: Atrasarse en sus pagos puede ser muy costoso. Por ejemplo, si usted se atrasa en el pago del dividendo un mes, el próximo cobro será el dividendo atrasado, los intereses, gastos de cobranza y el dividendo de ese período, tal como se muestra a continuación:

Dividendo atrasado	$ 153.703
Interés moratorio (5,29% anual)	$ 662
Gastos de cobranza*	$ 13.833
+ Próximo dividendo	$ 153.702
Total a pagar próximo mes por atraso:	**$ 321.901**

Cada cobro se calcula sobre el monto vencido no pagado.

*Los gastos de cobranza se aplicarán si usted demora más de 20 días en regularizar su pago.

La siguiente tabla muestra los dividendos que Ud. tiene pendiente por pagar. En caso de no tener dividendos atrasados, la tabla no tendrá información:

ESTADO DE SUS DIVIDENDOS ATRASADOS

Fecha de pago	Días atraso	N° Dividendo	Monto mensual	Interés moratorio	Monto total a pagar
20-06-2019	8	44	$153.703	$176	$153.879

INFORMACIÓN SOBRE LA GARANTÍA DE SU CRÉDITO

Tipo de Garantía: **Específica**

General El inmueble garantiza el pago de todas las deudas adquiridas con la institución que otorga el crédito.

Específica El inmueble garantiza solo el pago del crédito hipotecario.

SEGUROS ASOCIADOS A SU CRÉDITO HIPOTECARIO

1. Desgravamen

RECUERDE: Ud. siempre puede buscar nuevas ofertas de seguro

Costo mensual	$ 2.980
Nombre proveedor	BANCO CHILENO DE VIDA S.A.
Fecha de renovación	23-12-2019
N° de póliza	POL30527
Cobertura	Cubre el monto adeudado del crédito y hasta 3 dividendos morosos, a la fecha de fallecimiento del asegurado.

2. Incendio

Costo mensual	$4.700
Nombre proveedor	CHILENA SEGUROS S.A.
Fecha de renovación	23-12-2019
N° de póliza	POL30527
Cobertura	Paga los daños materiales del bien inmueble, a causa de sismo o incendio y otros adicionales, de acuerdo al monto del siniestro y hasta el monto indicado en la tasación del inmueble (monto asegurado).

3. The Experiment

The use of experiments to conduct public policy evaluations was recently recognized by the 2019 Nobel Prize in Economics awarded to Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer for their contributions in the experimental evaluation of development policies. in addition, international organizations, such as the World Bank (Gertler et al. 2016) and the OECD (2006), have widely recommended this method, and multiple governmental agencies have recently implemented it (Quan, 2019). The advantage of experimental methods is that they make it possible to rigorously measure the causal impact of a change in public policy by comparing the results of a group that faced the change (Treatment) with another that did not receive it (Control). Random assignment to treatment and control group ensures that the two groups are comparable before the intervention and, therefore, that the changes observed at the end are caused by the treatment(s) and not by other factors. Following those guidelines, SERNAC instructed professors Denise Laroze, Raymond Duch, and Mauricio López, from the Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS), from the Universities of Santiago de Chile and Oxford (Nuffield College), to design and conduct an experiment evaluating alternative templates of the Mortgage Statement in the decision of the consumers to look for refinancing opportunities in the mortgage market (quote loan options).

3.1 Design and Methodology

The experiment examined three alternatives of the obverse side of the Mortgage Statement prototype proposed by SERNAC. The experiment was implemented through a 20-30 minutes online survey to 548 financial consumers between the ages of 25 and 65. It is important to note that the online implementation of the interaction between the team of researchers and the participants resembles the conditions faced by a consumer who receives the Mortgage Statement by email.

Following the guidelines set by Gerber & Green (2012), the randomization of treatments was by age blocks and income levels. During the experiment, the participants were randomly assigned to a group (Control or Treatments) to measure their predisposition to quote a new mortgage loan. Each of the treatment alternatives marginally modified the information that it was incorporated. All the information shown to the participants was gathered from real conditions of Chilean mortgage loans (see Appendix 1 to Appendix 4).

Along with the treatments, a series of questions associated with the behavior of the participants were incorporated: (a) socio-demographic characteristics, (b) mathematical understanding and financial literacy (Bajo & Barbi 2015); (c) self-perception of the complexity of credit; (d) inter-temporal preferences (Johnson et al. 2015); and (e) risk preferences.

Each participant made decisions in four rounds to address a potential concern of the impact that variations of the loan conditions may have. In each of them, the participant observed different loans, but keeping the treatment constant. The rounds vary the distance between the client's interest rate and the average market rate (Short or Long Distance on the

Thermometer); and the amount of Savings (Low or High) if the person can lower the interest rate by one percentage point.

4. Results

The results of the experiment show that the new format of the Mortgage Statement (Figure 3) has the potential to increase quoting of alternative mortgage loans. Statistical results indicate that the probability of listing increases by 23.3% (between 18.3-28.4% considering the margin of error) among those who saw the new format with those who saw the current format of the Mortgage Statement. Considering that in Chile, there are around 1 million mortgage debtors, the results imply that between 200,000-300,000 people will be quoting loans opportunities (assuming that the results of the experiment can be transferred directly to the debtor population).

Figure 4. The impact of the treatments on the probability of choosing to quote new loans.



The results also suggest that the nudges themselves (T1), also have a marginal effect of 15.8% (between 10-20% if the margin of error is considered) in the proportion of people who choose to quote. Although this effect is positive, the result is lower than that one presented in Treatment 3.

It is essential to mention that a relevant part of the impact on the predisposition to quote is guided by the thermometer that reflects the distance between the interest rate on the consumers' loan and the average interest rate of the market. Nonetheless, it does not imply that the information on how much to save will not have an impact, but rather that the most significant impact occurs when the distance on the thermometer is larger. The evidence also suggests that the prototype of the Mortgage Statement increases the probability of correctly evaluating a loan scenario and that this effect is higher for the lower-income population.

It should be noted that the incorporation of information that explains the costs of the loan does not reduce the confidence people have in the Mortgage Statement; thus, adverse effects in this matter are ruled out. According to the data in this sample, the confidence in the Mortgage Statement presents a similar level of confidence that people say they have in Banks and Financial Institutions in general (correlation $\rho = 0.46$).

Finally, treatments are not associated with the probability of correctly answering all questions. The variable that seems to be associated with the level of understanding is the level of Financial Literacy that each participant has -independent of the treatments. This is not surprising, as it indicates that people who understand more about financial concepts are also more likely to answer credit comprehension questions correctly.

Following the results showed above, the report formulates a proposal for regulatory improvement to the Regulation of the information to the consumer of mortgage loans, recommending the redesigning of the current format of the Mortgage Statement, established in art. 22 of the Regulation.

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6. Appendices

Appendix 1: The format and content of the Mortgage Statement used for the Control group

	CAEV : 4,63%
Nombre Titular	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Fecha	XX-XX-XXXX
I. Producto Principal	
Plazo del Crédito pendiente (meses)	349
Número de Cuota	11/360
Saldo del Crédito	72.469.558
Valor del Dividendo	381.484
Fecha del Próximo Pago	xx-xx-xxxx
Costo Total del Pepago	72.841.145
Carga Anual Equivalente Vigente (CAEV)	4,63%
Garantías Vigentes	Específica
II. Historial	
Números de Dividendos Pagados	10
Número de Dividendos Vencidos No Paga	1
Monto vencido no Pagado	381.484
Detalle:	381.484 / Cuota 11
Tasa de interés	4,2%
Tasa de Interés aplicada	FIJA
III. Condiciones de Prepago	
Cargo Prepago	1,5 meses de intereses
Plazo de Aviso Prepago	Sin restricciones

Appendix 2: Treatment 1

Comunicación Trimestral Crédito Hipotecario

CAEV : 4,63%

Nombre Titular Fecha	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX-XX-XXXX
I. Producto Principal	
Plazo del Crédito pendiente (meses) Número de Cuota Saldo del Crédito Valor del Dividendo Fecha del Próximo Pago Costo Total del Pepago Carga Anual Equivalente Vigente (CAEV) Garantías Vigentes	349 11/360 72.469.558 381.484 xx-xx-xxxx 72.841.145 4,63% Específica
II. Historial	
Números de Dividendos Pagados Número de Dividendos Vencidos No Paga Monto vencido no Pagado Detalle:	10 1 381,484 381.484 / Cuota 11
Tasa de interés Tasa de Interés aplicada	4,2% FIJA
III. Condiciones de Prepago	
Cargo Prepago Plazo de Aviso Prepago	1,5 meses de intereses Sin restricciones

ESTADO DE SU CRÉDITO EN COMPARACIÓN A OTROS CONSUMIDORES DEL PAÍS



Si Ud. reduce su tasa de interés actual de 4,2% a 3,2%, el ahorro final en su crédito actual será

Ahorro: $ 13.329.642

Appendix 3: Treatment 2

Comunicación Trimestral Crédito Hipotecario

CAEV : 4,63%

Nombre Titular Fecha	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX-XX-XXXX
I. Producto Principal	
Plazo del Crédito pendiente (meses) Número de Cuota Saldo del Crédito Valor del Dividendo Fecha del Próximo Pago Costo Total del Pepago Carga Anual Equivalente Vigente (CAEV) Garantías Vigentes	349 11/360 72.469.558 381.484 xx-xx-xxxx 72.841.145 4,63% Específica
II. Historial	
Números de Dividendos Pagados Número de Dividendos Vencidos No Paga Monto vencido no Pagado Detalle:	10 1 381.484 381.484 / Cuota 11
Tasa de interés Tasa de Interés aplicada	4,2% FIJA
III. Condiciones de Prepago	
Cargo Prepago Plazo de Aviso Prepago	1,5 meses de intereses Sin restricciones

ESTADO DE SU CRÉDITO EN COMPARACIÓN A OTROS CONSUMIDORES DEL PAÍS



Si Ud. reduce su tasa de interés actual de 4,2% a 3,2%, el ahorro final en su crédito actual será

Ahorro: $ 13.329.642

INFORMACIÓN PARA COMPARAR LAS CONDICIONES DE SU CRÉDITO

Monto adeudado		Costo del Crédito		CTC (Costo Total del Crédito por pagar)
$72.469.558	+	**$61.049.675**	=	**$133.519.233**
Es el monto prestado pendiente por pagar		Es la suma de: Intereses: $52.091.894 Seguro: $8.957.781 Comisiones: $0		Será el monto pagado al termino de su crédito.
		La CAE vigente es un indicador que refleja el costo del crédito y le sirve para comparar con otras alternativas.	=	CAE vigente (Carga Anual Equivalente vigente) **4,63%**

⚠ Un **CTC** y/o **CAE** má bajo es un ahorro para Ud. considerando igual monto e igual plazo del crédito

Appendix 4: Treatment 3

Informativo TRimestral del Crédito Hipotecario
Descubra aquí si puede mejorar su crédito hipotecario

Estimado(a) Sr(a).

Esta comunicación contiene información actualizada sobre su crédito hipotecario. Ella ha sido diseñada por el Ministerio de Economía y SERNAC, y es enviada a Ud. en cumplimiento de la Ley Nº 19.496. Con ella Ud. podrá comparar la condiciones de su crédito y buscar mejores ofertas

Fecha: XX-XX-XXXX

RESUMEN DE DEUDA VIGENTE

Valor próximo dividiendo	$126,120	(13,7 UF)
Fecha pago próximo dividendo		12/31/19
Monto adeudado	$72.469.558	(2598,2 UF)
Dividendos pendientes y plazo		350 (29 años y 1 meses)
Fecha de inicio del contrato		9/1/18
Tipo de tasa de interés		Fija

*Valor U.F. = $27.892,17

ESTADO DE SU CRÉDITO EN COMPARACIÓN A OTROS CONSUMIDORES DEL PAÍS



Si Ud. reduce su tasa de interés actual de 4,2% a 3,2%, el ahorro final en su crédito actual será

Ahorro: $ 13.329.642

INFORMACIÓN PARA COMPARAR LAS CONDICIONES DE SU CRÉDITO

Monto adeudado: **$72.469.558**
Es el monto prestado pendiente por pagar

+

Costo del Crédito: **$61.049.675**
Es la suma de:
Intereses: $52.091.894
Seguro: $8.957.781
Comisiones: $0

=

CTC (Costo Total del Crédito por pagar): **$133.519.233**
Será el monto pagado al termino de su crédito.

La CAE vígente es un indicador que refleja el costo del crédito y le sirve para comparar con otras alternativas.

= CAE vígente (Carga Anual Equivalente vígente) **4,63%**

⚠ Un **CTC** y/o **CAE** má bajo es un ahorro para Ud. considerando igual monto e igual plazo del crédito

PASO A PASO PARA COMPARAR Y BUSCAR MEJORES OFERTAS DE CRÉDITO

- Paso 1 ☑ **Lea** atentamente esta cartilla.
- Paso 2 ☐ **Simule** una oferta crediticia por un préstamo de **$72.841.145*** en clientebancario.cl/simuladorhipotecario.
- Paso 3 ☐ **Busque** la mejor oferta con menor CTC (Costo Total Crédito) o menor CAE (Carga Anual Equivalente), considerando un crédito con igual plazo.
- Paso 4 ☐ **Solicite** en su institución financiera actual el documento "Liquidación de Prepago del Crédito para presentarlo en las instituciones financieras con las ofertas más convenietes (se lo deben entregar en máximo 3 días).
- Paso 5 ☐ **Escoja** el crédito hipotecario con las mejores condiciones.

*Este monto es la suma de " Monto Adeudado" y el "cargo por prepago" del crédito que su institución financiera puede cobrar conforme a la Ley Nº 18.010.
Cargo por Prepago: $371.587

Appendix 5: Logistic estimates of the probability of choosing to quote new mortgage loans by treatment, with and without controlling for unbalanced variables in treatment allocation, with *bootstrap clustered standard errors***.**

	Logit (1)	Efecto Marginal (1)	Logit (2)
T.1	0.794***	0.158***	0.817***
	(0.186)	(0.025)	(0.191)
T.2	0.712***	0.145***	0.728***
	(0.208)	(0.026)	(0.195)
T.3	1.343***	0.234***	1.334***
	(0.253)	(0.026)	(0.231)
Hombre			0.461**
			(0.163)
Nivel de Riesgo 2			−0.205
			(0.218)
Nivel de Riesgo 3			0.152
			(0.274)
Nivel de Riesgo 4			−0.103
			(0.291)
Nivel de Riesgo 5			0.064
			(0.280)
Sesgo Presente - Bajo			0.560***
			(0.144)
Constante	0.559***		0.109
	(0.145)		(0.252)
Observaciones	2,193		2,116
χ^2	79.177*** (df = 3)		127.729*** (df = 9)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001